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INTERPRETATION OF ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
When a legislative body undertakes a fundamental change in
the structure of society, it is wise to simply set forth general prin-
ciples, and let the courts make the specific applications which will
become crystallized into detailed rules. The wisdom of this method
of proceeding is indicated by experience in the development of our
constitutional law-it is the peculiar genius of the common law
system that the courts are able to develop the law efficiently in this
manner. In entering upon the control of monopolistic practices in
the economic system through the Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress
therefore wisely contented itself with the setting forth of general
principles. In general the same approach has been followed in other
antimonopolistic legislation.1
However, in the course of time the judicial decisions upon the
subject have gradually produced a confused state of the law which
makes it difficult, and at times almost impossible, for businessmen
and their counsel to chart a safe course. On the one hand, Congress
and the courts tell the businessman that he must compete; on the
other hand, the Federal Trade Commission is constantly telling him,
in the form of complicated restrictions, what he must not do when
he competes. It is becoming increasingly difficult for him to chart a
course between Scylla and Charybdis, and many a business plan
has come to grief in the attempt. The statutes provide for fines, im-
prisonment and injunctioffs in actions brought by the Department of
Justice, cease and desist orders in proceedings of the Federal Trade
Commission, and treble damages and injunctions through litiga-
tion brought by private parties.
Formerly, judicial decisions furnished the practitioner with at
least some trustworthy landmarks. In the first place, they laid down
the basic principle that our common law heritage could be drawn
upon as a guide to what was lawful and what was unlawful. 2 In the
second place, they provided reasonably reliable precedents on cardi-
nal points. Thus the Steel case was respected authority that size was
not per se an offense ;3 the Cement case was assurance that stabiliz-
1. The statutes in the field of satirust law embraces in general the antust laws as that
term is defined by Congress. e.g., the Sherman and Clayton Acts. supplemental legis.
lation such as the Federal Trae Commission Act, and various amndadory a=cts. See
generally 15 U. S. C.§ 1. (1940) e sgq. (Where detailed provisions are resorted to.
as in the Robison-Pa, n Act, they are lagly unintelligible.)
2. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.. 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898); Stadard
Oil Co. v. United States. 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Federal Trade Comm. v. Gnrz, 253
U.S. 421 (1920 S
3. United States v. U1ied Sate Steel Corp.. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
ing activities between competitors were not necessarily unlawful;4
and the G.E. case promised recognition of the Constitution's guar-
antee of exclusive rights to the patents.5
In recent times a marked change has occurred in the economic
philosophy of the executive and judicial branches of the govern-
ment, which has caused them to question much of their previous
thinking on the legality of business practices. The judicial and ad-
ministrative landmarks of the past accordingly are being subjected
to the most critical review, and in the course of this enforcement
officials and courts have frequently departed from their predeces-
sors views.
Envincing a critical attitude toward one of the newer efforts,
Mr. Justice Douglas, on behalf of himself and three other justices,
recently said of the G.E. case:
"This Court, not Congress was the author of the doctrine fol-
lowed in that case. The rule it sanctions is another of the private
perquisites which the court has written into the patent laws. See
Special Equipment Co. v. ,Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 383. Since we created
it, we should take the initiative in eliminating it."'6
The current critical review of antitrust law has created a state
of confusion in the antitrust field which some have characterized
as bordering on anarchy. Even during periods of fairly static eco-
nomic thinking, discrepancies and contradictions and occasional re-
versals have occurred in the decisions. When sharp and compre-
hensive breaks with the past occur, however, and each member of
the judiciary assumes the independent role of an original lawgiver,
the discrepancies, contradictions and reversals are multiplied many
fold. Old landmarks have become wholly unreliable, and even cur-
rent precedent is subject to the timetable caveat of change without
notice.
The present unreliable status of old precedent is illustrated by
the Line MateriaP and South-Easterns cases. In each, precedent
overwhelmingly favored the defendants, yet in each the defendants
lost.
4. Cement Manufacturing Protective Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
5. United States v. General Electric Co.. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
6. See Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287, 321 (1948).
7. United states v. Line Material Co.. 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
8. United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
The uncertain status of even current precedent is underscored
by the controversial Cement case. Three years earlier the Supreme
Court in the Corn Products and Staey9 cases had gone out of its
way to deny that it was condemning all basing point systems,
explaining carefully in the first case, for example:
"We think this legislative history indicated only that Congress
was unwilling to require f.o.b. factory pricing, and thus to make all
uniform delivered price systems and all-basing point systems illegal
per se." 10
The court nevertheless ruled three years later in the Cement
Institute case that:
"... .the combined effect of the two cases was to forbid the
adoption for sales purposes of any basing point price system.""
Statutes have been construed in an original manner. The equi-
table provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act have, by an imagina-
tive quirk of statutory construction, been held to amend the criminal
sanctions of the Sherman Act ;12 and the exculpatory provisos of
the Robinson-Patman Act on "meeting competition" 13 and "for
services rendered" 14 have been effectively read out of the statute.
Consistency has lost certain of its virtue. The majority in the
Hartford-Empire case1 5 emphasized the necessity for reviewing
lower courts, while tht minority criticized such review; yet substan-
tially the same majority on substantially the same issues in the
National Lead case16 urged abstinence from review, while the same
minority took the position that lower courts sometimes made mis-
takes.
Terminology has frequently become inexact. Thus a single
trader was held guilty of a "boycott" in the A&P case. 17
Decisions have been reached, furthermore, by most unusual
divisions of the Justices of the Supreme Court. One Justice wrote
9. Federal Trade Commission v. A.M. Staley Mfg. Co.. 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
10. Corn Products Co. v Federal Trade Commission. 324 U.S. 726, 737 (1945).
11. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute. 333 U.S. 683. 723 (1948).
12. United States v. Hutchinson. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
13. Standard Oil of Indiana v. Federal Trade Commission. 173 P.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
14. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission 96 F.2d 687. (2d Cir. 1938).
cat. deted, 305 U.S. 634 (1938); and Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission. 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939). cat. denied 308 U.S. 625(1940).
15. Hatford-Empire Company v. United States. 323 U.S. 386 and 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
16. United States v. National Lead Co.. 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
17. United States v. The New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 273 F.2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949).
the court's opinion in the Associated Press case18 in general terms;
another Justice wrote a concurring opinion attempting more spe-
cifically to explain the Court's opinion; another Justice questioned
this explanation but offered no specific alternative; and others wrote
dissenting opinions. In the Line Material case19 no Justice was able
to endorse the Court's opinion except the Justice who wrote it.
We should not criticize re-examination of the dead hand of
precedent. Some precedents perhaps were appropriately laid at
rest; and still others perhaps should be.20 As for the complaint of
confusion-when law goes through an evolutionary phase of de-
velopment in order to conform to new conditions, confusion may be
the inevitable price that must and should gladly be paid therefor.
The most serious objection that may properly be leveled at this
evolutionary process is directed to its retroactive aspects. A client
may in good faith conform closely to what his attorneys believed to
be the law. He may even file his agreements with the government.
Nevertheless, years later the court-in order to enunciate new law
-may retroactively condemn those bona fide transactions and im-
pose ex post facto penalties of cancellation of contracts, confiscation
of patent rights and divestiture of important business interests. This
new law may even evolve in criminal actions.21
Mr. Justice Cardozo once proposed that such judicial process
of evolution should be prospective only in a manner analogous to
statutes. 22 May not the courts, in evolving new concepts of social
justice through the medium of the antitrust laws, thus properly
safeguard the rights of the individual as well as those of society?
Must retroactive punishment necessarily accompany judicial prog-
ress? This difficulty does not arise when the government contents
itself with asking for an injunction in a civil suit.
Legal counsel should approach a problem in this field on the
theory that the applicable law has never been definitely adjudicated.
The courts are presently engaged in the legislative process of evalu-
ating old and creating new law in the antitrust field. The rulings of
the administrative agencies as well as those of the courts must be
minutely examined. Although the Supreme Court of the United
18. Anociated Pie. v. United Som 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
19. United Sates v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
20. See, e.g., Arrow Hart & Hegenan Eearic Co. v. F..C.. 291 U.S. 587(1934).
21. United Saes v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n.. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
22. Hall. Selected Writinp of Cado 35-37 (1947).
States is the final authority, the decisions of the lower Federal
courts and of the Federal Trade Commission on matters on which
the Supreme Court has not spoken are most significient as indi-
cating current trends in legal and economic thinking. Consent
judgements negotiated by the Department of Justice are also of
great interest. The most convenient means of access to these is the
Trade Regulation Services.
In evaluating the effect upon the law of judicial opinions in the
antitrust field, the reasoning, as distinguished from the decision on
the facts before the court, is particularly important. The actual hold-
ings are usually sui generis and affected by special factors not com-
mon to subsequent cases. Thus the decision in the Associated Press
case23 was influenced by the famous private controversy between
two Chicago publishers; and the Columbia Steel decision 24 was in
large part necessitated by the Attorney General's Geneva Steel
opinion therein referred to.
Dicta are often more important than the holdings. The Trans-
wrap case,25 for example, approved patent licensing which exacted
reciprocal exclusive licenses from a license, but this approval was
couched in language usually viewed as outlawing this coercive
practice for all practical purposes. The heated controversy in the
Cement Institute case,26 to give another example, involves sig-
nificantly its dicta and not its holding.
The burden of proof is theoretically upon the government, but
for all practical purposes it rests upon the defendants attempting to
justify the transactions involved. Formerly the burden actually was
upon the Government, to demonstrate both that the antitrust laws
were applicable to the particular business transactions, and that
those laws were violated thereby. The courts did not assume auto-
matically that all business was reached by these federal laws,2 7 nor
that certain business phenomena such as price uniformity-unless
explained-were conspiratorial.28 The antitrust laws are today au-
tomatically assumed to apply to business transactions in the absence
of some extraordinary showing by the defendant. Intrastate busi-
ness is brought within the net by a most liberal interpretation of its
effect upon interstate commerce. Judicial decisions in the past de-
23. Associated Press v. United States. 326 U.S. 1 (1945)
24. United Stares v. Columbia heel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1949).
25. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
26. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
27. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore Inc. v. National LagSu. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
28. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 69 . (1927).
ciding that a business was not subject to the antitrust laws can not
now be relied upon.2 9
Indeed there seems to be in the making an almost foolproof
method of shifting the burden of proof in antitrust cases to the de-
fendant. On the one hand, if the case involves a single defendant,
that defendant is usually of appreciable size. This size in and of
itself is said to indicate a potentiality for wrongdoing requiring
justification. 30 On the other hand, should the case involve a num-
ber of defendants, there is necessarily present uniformity of action
of some nature, under elementary operation of the law of the market
place. This uniformity-whether of price31 or other action 32 simi-
larly is viewed to indicate wrongdoing requiring justification by the
defendants. Where a defendant is of large size and uniformity of
prices exists, the defendant is substantially assumed to be guilty
until he proves to the contrary.
The "rule of reason" has traditionally governed the interpre-
tation of the antitrust law. To-day, however, its position is being
shaken. Certain transactions are held unlawful per se,33 such as
price fixing,3 ' patent tying 35 and boycotts. 36 Other transactions, if
the Government has its way, are to be added to this list, such as
exclusive sales agreements. 37
The antitrust laws, moreover, even when interpreted in accord-
ance with the rule of reason, are not always found today to favor the
same reasons that appealed to previous judges. The current inter-
pretation of the rule of reason was perhaps most succinctly sum-
marized in the Giboney case, in which the court said that in the
absence of an express statutory exemption: ". . . violations of anti-
trust laws could not be defended on the ground that a particular ac-
cused combination would not injure but would actually help manu-
facturers, laborers, retailers, consumers, or the public in general." 38
29. United Sates v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 US. 533 (1944).
30. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
31. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
32. Intersoe Ciroait v. United States. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
33. United Ss . Columbia S Co.. 334 U. 495 (1948).
34. United v. Sacony-Vacu n Oil Co.. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
35. International Salt Co. v. United States. 332 US. 392 (1947).
36. Fashion Orisinatm Guild of America. Inc.. v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457(1941).
37. United Stat e. Standard Oil of California. 78 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
38. Joseph GibMney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
Although the rule of reason is no longer a sure guide, it still
has some vitality, and will continue to be applied in the antitrust
field.
In conclusion, the antitrust laws consist largely of judicial de-
cisions, and these today are currently being reappraised, with at-
tendant uncertainties to all concerned. The future enforcement of
the antitrust laws is believed to depend, to a considerable degree,
upon whether or not we have continued prosperity. If we do, we
should have continued strict enforcement of these antitrust laws.
With a depression, however, enforcement of those laws will, as be-
fore, inevitably be relaxed in the interest of stability. To illustrate,
the antitrust laws are said to forbid any competitive price tam-
pering, 39 but when prices are spiralling downwards and bankrupt-
cies are mounting upwards, resort will necessarily be had to many
stabilizing activities.
Melville P. Windle
39. United States v. Sacony-Vacuum Oil Co.. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
